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Abstract 
This article rethinks anthropomorphic representation and animated animality within the 
context of the contemporary digital era and, more precisely, against the rise of the 
computer-animated feature film. By interrogating the fractured identity of the 
anthropomorph as a necessarily hybrid figuration, it suggests how popular computer-
animated films have rejected ánthrōpos and instead exploited the non-human morphē 
element to manipulate virtual space through anthropomorphic subjectivity. The 
anthropomorph is here refined into a more prescriptive and functional agent, absorbing the 
audience into a spectatorial game that sharpens their awareness of the digital realm. Films 
such as Ratatouille (Brad Bird, 2007) and Bee Movie (Simon J. Smith & Steve Hickner, 2007) 
are offered as case studies that reflect the shift towards the form or morphē element, one 
that is registered through a particular mode of subjectivied address. Drawing on Gilles 
Deleuze’s notion of ‘gaseous perception’ to elucidate this delivery of enlivened space, this 
article argues that the computer-animated film is implicated in a hierarchical switch away 
from humanlike behaviour to embrace the possibilities of the anthropomorph’s non-
human morphē identity, thereby upturning the received narrative of how 
anthropomorphism has been conceptualised among critical studies of animation.  
 
Keywords 
Animation, anthropomorphism, Pixar, animals, computer-animated film, Sergei Eisenstein, 
plasmaticness, subjectivity, focalization, Gilles Deleuze, gaseous perception.   
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Introduction 
The prevailing orthodoxy concerning the construction and engagement with fictional 
animated characters is their organisation around behavioural patterns that are anchored to 
recognisably ‘human’ psychology, intentionality and proportion. At the root of this 
representational regime lies the creative and informative model of anthropomorphism, a 
term whose etymology can be traced back to 6th Century Greece, combining ἄνθρωπος 
(ánthrōpos) defined as human and μορφή (morphē) meaning shape or form. Invested 
primarily in the perception, presence and impression of consciousness, anthropomorphic 
representation holds particular currency within the histories and traditions of the animated 
cartoon. Patrick Power argues that persuasive ‘anthropomorphic personification’ is 
ultimately a defining register of animated aesthetics, so ‘pervasive in cartoon and 3D 
feature animation that it is virtually synonymous stylistically with these genres’ (2008: 37). 
Animation’s evolution from hand-drawn to digital systems, from painted cel to single-point 
pixel, has done very little to moderate or destabilise the frequency of anthropomorphic 
representation across the medium’s visual grammar. The earliest cycle of computer-
animated shorts produced under the creative guidance of John Lasseter at the Pixar 
Animation Studios during the 1980s followed the Golden Age blueprint of Walt Disney 
and Warner Brothers by assuming a strong anthropomorphic approach. Luxo Jr. (John 
Lasseter, 1986), Red’s Dream (John Lasseter, 1987), Tin Toy (John Lasseter, 1988) and Knick 
Knack (John Lasseter, 1989) centred upon the activity and agency of an anglepoise lamp, 
abandoned unicycle, child’s musical toy and snow globe, objects whose sudden sentience 
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ran counter to the human involvement typically required to fulfil each item’s function. 
Pixar’s commercial projects and television advertisements made during this late-
1980s/early-1990s period (for Listerine, Gummi Savers and Tropicana amongst others) 
similarly provided a space in which filmmakers such as Lasseter, Andrew Stanton, Pete 
Docter, Jan Pinkava, Jeff Pidgeon and Galyn Susman honed their craft by pushing at the 
boundaries of anthropomorphic characterisation, at the same time as they tested the visual 
possibilities of emergent computer graphics. 
 With the release of Toy Story (John Lasseter, 1995) and the arrival of the feature-
length computer-animated film format, ‘persuasive’ anthropomorphosis had reached, in the 
words of Andrew Darley, an ‘extraordinary’ level (2000: 91). Indeed, the relatively short 
history of computer-animated filmmaking remains strongly interwoven with 
anthropomorphic characters and images. While biologically recognisable humans (and, in 
some instances, ‘super’ humans) do jostle for prominence as protagonists, ‘humanised’ 
animals and non-humans more regularly function as narrative agents populating these 
three-dimensional digital worlds, occupying and inhabiting virtual spaces through their 
residency and contributing to their plentiful ‘‘fullness’ of people’ (Heath, 1981: 179). 
Supporting both single stories and entire series - in the case of the Ice Age (2002-), 
Madagascar (2005-2012) and Kung Fu Panda (2008-) franchises - anthropomorphism remains 
the computer-animated film’s default register, no less embedded within its screen narratives 
than it is implicated in those wider marketing and promotional enterprises that inform 
contemporary consumer-brand culture (Lanier et al, 2014: 35-54).1  
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Within the history and representational field of animated anthropomorphism, 
however, little distinction has been made between the pre-war era of Gertie the Dinosaur, 
Felix the Cat and Mickey Mouse, the anarchy of Looney Tunes’ talking ducks and 
‘wabbits,’ and the spate of contemporary digital anthropomorphs that are assigned complex 
personalities in advance of (or in conflict with) culturally ‘assumed’ personae that stem 
from an animal’s ‘unwitting’ semblance and mimicry of human conduct (Gould, 1987: 504). 
Mainstream computer-animated films have ultimately been subsumed into a broader 
creative anthropomorphosis, which represents a ‘curious mix of ‘fantasy’ and ‘reality’ in 
which the spectator can recognise human traits in […] animal figures’ (Wells, 2002: 161). 
By contrast, the newly digital constitution of anthropomorphism has fundamentally altered 
the way in which anthropomorphic representation and animated animality can function 
within an animated context. The guiding principle of this article, then, is to approach and 
elucidate anthropomorphism by forging a more fluid connection between the digital 
constructs of anthropomorph and diegetic world. To do so will involve some semantic 
reconfiguration, thinking more conceptually about the form or morphē component of the 
anthropomorph that is increasingly being raised into prominence at the expense of any 
prevailing humanness (ánthrōpos). By interrogating more directly the in-between and 
fractured identity of the anthropomorph as a hybrid figuration between poles of animacy 
and inanimacy, this article argues how computer-animated films have exploited the non-
human morphē element of its characters - over any prevailing interest in their fluctuating 
degrees of human connotation - to control virtual space through anthropomorphic 
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subjectivity. With digital environments now glimpsed through the eyes of others, the virtual 
space has become increasingly articulated through a multiplicity of limited, broadened and 
unstable perspectives, with the increased manoeuvrability and peripatetic behaviour of the 
anthropomorph yielding new spatial orientations and possibilities for disparate fields of 
vision. Supported by developments in computer-animation and a virtual camera 
unencumbered with positional constraints, embodied anthropomorphic point-of-view in 
the computer-animated film is anchored to the nomadic sauntering of sentient non-human 
characters who are prized for their subjective abilities as ulterior forms or morphēs, rather 
than valued for their strict paralleling of human behaviour. Such a switch of emphasis both 
licenses the mastery of geographic exploration by computer-animated anthropomorphs 
across the virtual terrain, but also reconfigures the received narrative surrounding the 
function of these most enduring of character archetypes.  
 
A special relationship: anthropomorphism’s ‘animated’ history  
Despite the widespread integration of animal and human intelligence across art, culture and 
religion, from Egyptian gods and deities, spiritual pre-Paleolithic shamanist culture, 
children’s literature and folk tales (Beatrix Potter, George Orwell), mythology’s divine 
beings and scientific examinations of animal behaviour, many writers have reflected upon 
why animated films have been consistently gripped by anthropomorphosis, their worlds 
often anthropomorphous in invention and design. Recent scholarship has not only tackled 
the topic of animated anthropomorphs in their multiplicity and variance, but also tied the 
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very history of animation as an early twentieth-century medium to ‘the spectacle of 
anthropomorphism’ and the visual pleasure of ‘seeing something move as though it were 
human’ (Riffel, 2012: 5). As agents of narrative and supported by discourses of visual and 
behavioural familiarity, animated anthropomorphs certainly permit the aesthetic 
exploration, dilution, exaggeration and satirising of the machinations of the human 
condition (psychology, intent, behaviour, socio-cultural hierarchies) through devices of 
allegory and analogy, symbolism and signification. Such meaningful anthropomorphic 
characters therefore function as ‘pragmatic’ solutions, part of an ‘anthropocentric’ 
explanatory concept insofar as they evidence how humans are able to ‘make sense’ of ‘the 
deeply enigmatic and often hostile world in which they inhabit’ (Lanier et al, 2014: 37) 
through the ascription of human connotation. 
 Allied to the ability of animated anthropomorphs (as visual phenomena or 
simulacra) to carry a host of implicit meanings, the attribution of humanlike qualities to 
non-human (often animal) characters as they intentionally act, and move seamlessly within, 
an animated space, has been theorised as a fundamental requirement of character design. 
Anthropomorphism is a representational strategy of accessibility, continually revived by 
animators to pique spectator recognition, interest, empathy and compassion in the 
animated figure being observed. Cognitivist Torben Grodal (1997: 89), for example, argues 
that:  
  
7 
 
When watching a visual representation of phenomena without any centring 
anthropomorphic actants, we often ‘lose interest’ owing to lack of emotional 
motivation or the cognitive analysis of the perceived, a fact which many 
makers of experimental films have discovered when presenting their films to 
a mass audience. 
 
Lasseter had certainly highlighted the value of anthropomorphism when giving his well-
received and influential industry paper at the SIGGRAPH conference in July 1987, in 
which he discussed the necessity for appeal and personality across computer-animated 
characters. Speaking at length about the digitally-animated short films The Adventures of 
André and Wally B (Alvy Ray Smith, 1984) and Luxo Jr., Lasseter observed how the desire 
for anatomical magnetism and perceptible ‘charm’ was rooted in the display of numerous 
human archetypes that compensated for the fact ‘the live-action actor has charisma’ (1987: 
35-44). For the early pioneers of computer-animated technology, this allure (and the 
success of the character to be read as ‘true’ by the intended child audience) was 
communicated through an anthropomorphic schema: humanlike body dimensions matched 
with the hypothetical behaviour of objects under a range of disparate emotional states. 
Lasseter’s particular ‘concentration’ on his characters’ eyes was a key principle of the 
filmmaker’s approach to anthropomorphism, one predicated on spectators’ ability to 
coherently register the ‘direction and purpose’ of computer-animated figures through a 
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sensitivity to their ocular cues (including their ‘stark black pupils’ and ‘erratic blinking’) 
(Neupert, 2016: 40-41). 
The ubiquity with which the cartoon form has been driven by an anthropomorphic 
impulse stems from the synonymy between animation and anthropomorphism as artistic 
models. Both are rhetorical strategies in service of characterisation: invested in degrees of 
personification, the impression (and impassion) of consciousness, and the presumption of 
subjectivity. Tim Tyler’s description of anthropomorphism as ‘The practice of attributing 
intentionality, purpose, or volition to some creature or abstraction that (allegedly) does not 
have these things’ (2003: 269) could reasonably be offered as an explanation of animated 
technique and its predilection for movement, illusory action and the vigour of expressive 
agency. Yet animation simultaneously obliges any anthropomorphic imperative as an 
autonomous, visualisation and elaboration of conscious thinking. It is a medium that can dilute 
or attenuate a variety of representational positions within anthropomorphism as a social 
phenomenon, animating the kinds of civilising approaches to the non-human which, as 
Cliff Hamilton suggests, is something us humans have been undertaking for ‘as long as 
there has been a developed form of communication’ (1983: 166). Psychologists have 
examined at length this widespread phenomenon of pareidolia and the hard-wired, intuitive 
presumption of human consciousness that sees faces within places (separate from apophenia, 
or the visibility of meaningful patterns and connections in irregular data clusters). Within a 
clinical environment, the systematic misidentification of a particular stimulus according to 
degrees of personhood and human physiognomy has been a staple of the psychological 
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Rorschach inkblot test, and has contributed to examinations of children’s brain skills of 
perception, recognition and comprehension.  
Pixar’s fourth computer-animated film Monsters, Inc. (Pete Docter, 2001) is highly 
explicit in drawing attention to the dramatic possibilities enabled by such ‘false’ information 
processing, and the role of animation in supplementing the unconscious projection of 
personality at the centre of anthropomorphic thinking. Monsters, Inc. opens at bed time on a 
restless, agitated young boy, who, during one of his nervous glances towards his cupboard 
door, briefly glimpses a slithering tentacle draped ominously over his bedroom chair (see 
Figures 1a and 1b). Shutting his eyes and summoning the courage to look again, the young 
boy is soon relieved to discover that the cause of his discomfort was merely the sleeve of a 
protruding jumper (see Figures 1c and 1d). Yet in Monsters, Inc., the boy’s unconscious 
attribution of humanlike form through pareidolia as a process of ‘magical thinking’ (Zusne & 
Jones, 2014: 77) is made concrete by the monstrous reality of the scenario. In an inverse 
disclosure, the initial impression of monstrosity and its ‘realistic’ demystification is itself a 
false reveal. The child (as anthropomorphiser) was correct in his original assumption, and 
the jumper is indeed a monster’s extended appendage, albeit belonging to a creature who 
proves physically inept and, as a result, fails to pass what is nothing more than a scare 
simulation. Through its anthropomorphic agenda, then, Monsters, Inc. discloses how 
animation is capable of extending the terms of anthropomorphism as a psychological 
process by actualising the cognitive phenomenon of witnessing humanlike configurations. 
The ‘intentional stance’ (Kennedy, 1992: 93) fundamentally embroiled within 
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anthropomorphism - that supposes non-human desire, mental propulsion and predictive 
behaviour - is here made complicit in a deception. The anthropocentric perception of 
monsters by the child in Monsters, Inc. is offered, in turn, as a visual possibility, an inaccuracy 
and then a certainty.  
[Figure 1 position] 
The overriding discourse of ‘humanisation’ entwined with the anthropomorph is, as 
many animation scholars (Sandler, 1997; Wells, 2009) have made clear, part of the history 
of (how spectators have engaged with) animation, and thus expectedly finds a place within 
theories germane to an understanding of the medium. Anthropomorphism lies at the 
cornerstone of Sergei Eisenstein’s writing on ‘plasmaticness,’ reflecting the allure that the 
Russian filmmaker and formalist felt towards Disney cartoons, and how scientific 
‘categories of zoology’ were unsettled through their seductive (and empathetic) 
anthropomorphic fantasy (1988: 4). An Eisensteinian ecstasy towards the anthropomorph 
has continued to underscore the figure’s sustained visual curiosity and increasing 
prevalence within the contemporary era of computer-animated cinema. Power argues that 
‘the idea of a rat in a restaurant would normally evoke disgust, but Remy the rodent/chef 
anthromorph in Ratatouille [Brad Bird, 2007] is more likely instead to engage and intrigue 
aesthetically’ (2008: 26). Such admiration for the captivating anthropomorphic form within 
Pixar’s culinary comedy supersedes the spectators’ distaste towards the rodent’s skilled 
preparation of gourmet cuisine. For Power, the magnetism of the anthropomorph is 
squared to its liminal, in-between identity, with the anthropomorph ‘on the edge of chaos, 
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both at once’ (Power, 2008: 23), insofar as it is caught within a transitional cycle of change 
between ánthrōpos (humanity) and morphē (form). The animated anthropomorph 
ultimately shimmers as an intrinsically ambiguous and fragmented agent, a mix of 
competing (and reciprocating) personalities and scenarios, and split by the rhetorical 
separating body the boundary or ‘slash’ that divides ‘rodent/chef’ in Power’s description. 
The ‘slash’ is a semantic synecdoche confirming the anthropomorph’s chaotic identity as a 
combination of multiple forms, a schizophrenic tension inhabited by the constituents of 
ánthrōpos and morphē that has prompted Wells to coin the ‘Madagascar problem.’ 
Referring to the DreamWorks computer-animated film franchise that includes an assured 
African lion, hypochondriac giraffe, energetic zebra and sassy New York hippopotamus as 
its main cast, Wells describes the often tricky negotiation of animal (natural) and human 
(cultural) discourses within the politics of anthropomorphic identity. He points to a mutual 
dependency between human socialisation and the preservation of ‘true animal actions, 
behaviour and primal motivation,’ a relationship that supports the ‘inner logic’ (Wells, 
2009: 22) of anthropomorphosis as animation’s common representational strategy.  
Despite the ongoing participation of computer-animated films with an 
anthropomorphic register, this article argues that their many humanised animal narratives 
have ultimately engaged the confrontation of animism and humanism with a greater degree 
of fluidity between those components either side of the ‘slash.’ Animators have looked to 
rigorously take advantage of the etymology of the anthropomorph by confronting its 
fractured and hybrid state. The presence of the paradigmatic ‘slash’ in Power’s description 
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(separating Remy as ‘rodent/chef’) certainly raises important questions about which of the 
two identities in the anthropomorph should be ranked most ‘animate.’ However, this article 
does not reinforce the slash as fixed or immovable, nor does it eliminate it entirely, as each 
move would only muddy the waters even further. To begin to examine how computer-
animated films typically meld together human and non-human registers, this article 
conceptualises the division between ánthrōpos and morphē as an altogether more porous 
channel through which ánthrōpos and morphē are permitted to interface and collide. The 
consequence of this representational shift towards form (morphē) at the expense of 
humanity (ánthrōpos) is that computer-animated film narratives have increasingly mined 
the non-human element of the splintered anthropomorph for its expressive, creative 
potential. 
 
Ánthrōpos/morphē  
The new legibility of the non-human, morphē characteristics in computer-animated film 
anthropomorphs is openly registered through a style of performance that frequently 
withdraws from ánthrōpos (attribution of human characteristics), and instead more readily 
inscribes elements of form as an opposition or complement to familiar humanlike qualities. 
In his discussion of puppet/puppeteer interaction, John Bell usefully speaks of ‘the weird 
concept of letting the object determine the action,’ a process that is underpinned by 
‘figuring out’ how ‘structure determines movement’ (2008: 7). The assumption that human 
activity is the overwhelming blueprint for a non-human’s presumed emotions is 
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destabilised in computer-animated films by the persistence of the morphē as an essential 
form of the anthropomorph that never alters. It is the anthroporph’s morphē (rather than 
its human connotation) that is ultimately permitted to takes centre stage, interceding into 
the ‘action’ to both signal and dictate a mode of acting no longer committed to human-
centred appeal. This gives licence for computer-animated films to navigate beyond 
traditional performance styles, and instead inaugurate a new form of ‘method acting’ that 
hinges upon – and exhibits the spectacle of - the magnetism of the morphē.  
Drawing its design policy from Tex Avery’s animated short One Cab’s Family (1952) 
and Susie the Little Blue Coupe (Clyde Geronomi, 1952) made at the Disney studio - and with 
character names indebted to Isaac Asimov’s short story Sally (1953) - both Cars (John 
Lasseter, 2006) and its sequel Cars 2 (John Lasseter, 2011) immediately throw into relief the 
performance potential of the morphē. Within each film’s creative process of automobile 
customisation, emotion in these sentient ‘smart’ cars is expressed through a familiar 
anthropomorphic design: eyes across the windshield, with mouths positioned over the 
front grille above the bumper. Yet each vehicle’s anatomical coherency (key to the 
projection of ‘emotion,’ ‘personality’ and ‘charm’) and the application of human descriptors 
are often placed subservient to - or at least in dialogue with – a new level of engagement 
with the language of the object. These cars do not ‘age’, they rust, while a burst tyre 
constitutes nothing more than minor injury (though an oil spill is an embarrassing sign of 
incontinence). Cars of a particular vintage additionally cough and splutter, and their 
imperfect, ‘aged’ bodywork is often matched with old-fashioned, outdated views. This is 
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most obvious in the characters of Mater, a redneck tow truck, but also aging hippie 
Fillmore, who as a VW Type 2 camper van with psychedelic paintwork plainly gestures to 
1960s American counterculture. Bell acknowledges that in the case of the automobile’s 
perceived cultural value, ‘cars have their own personalities, marked by make, color, size, 
style, and power’ (2008: 172), something that Cars and Cars 2 dramatize through multi-
faceted characters that successfully support our emotional investment over the course of a 
feature-length (both the Cars films are the longest in the Pixar oeuvre). However, despite 
each films’ capabilities for convincing humanlike automobiles acting and reacting for our 
spectatorial pleasure, the discursive power of the performances in Cars and Cars 2 
frequently hinges upon the exposure of communicative cues fundamental to their status as 
cars (typically, mechanical deficiency). The sporadic lapses into morphē momentarily 
alleviate the anthropomorph’s degree of humanity, and reminds spectators of the authentic 
(if fallible) ‘bodies’ of cars by equating, in the case of Cars 2 villain Miles Axelrod, a leaking 
engine with public humiliation. 
The computer-animated film’s attraction towards the authentic form of the non-
human can, however, be further disclosed through narratives in which anthropomorphs are 
obliged to shed any acquired humanlike characteristics or identity (ánthrōpos), and instead 
fully encouraged to embrace their true morphē. In the DreamWorks computer-animated 
film Shark Tale (Vicky Jenson, Bibo Bergeron & Rob Letterman, 2004), compassionate 
great white shark Lenny is rejected by his criminal shark family for his unforgiveable 
vegetarian preferences. Just as Bruce the Shark in Finding Nemo (Andrew Stanton, 2003) 
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attends underwater self-help classes to rehabilitate his natural carnivorous tendencies, 
Lenny’s latent vegetarianism is perceived as a ‘flaw’ within his true sharkhood, one that has 
been widely understood among ideological criticism as a symbol of Lenny’s ‘odd’ sexuality 
and performance of gay masculinity (King et al 2010: 45). In Walt Disney’s Bolt (Chris 
Williams & Byron Howard, 2008), the eponymous canine must actually learn true animal 
actions following a pampered career spent in front of television cameras: a profession that 
has systematically rid him of typical dog skills. A protracted musical montage expresses the 
dog’s attempt at burying bones and fetching sticks (‘it’s really a dog thing’), and the 
acquisition of ‘dogness’ is invoked by the film to develop the cross-species romance 
between Bolt and feline companion Mittens against the backdrop of the former’s 
procurement of true animalism.  
A network of relationships are clearly erected in computer-animated films between 
ánthrōpos and morphē as factors of identity held in delicate, even interchangeable, 
compromise. Yet by awarding space for the anthropomorph’s primal instinct, base 
behaviour or the recuperation of an underlying morphē, these are films that actively 
interrogate what it means for a particular kind of animal or object to become subject to 
consciousness. Furthermore, if humanlike ‘actants’ drive the spectators’ relationship of 
complicity with the anthropomorph (fostering audience reflection and introspection at the 
very image of humanity presented), then qualities and meanings drawn from the non-
human morphē element permit ulterior connections with objects and animals of the world, 
and emphatic distinctions to be made regarding non-human ways of being. Sidestepping 
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dominant criticisms levelled at anthropomorphic thinking by scientific studies that ‘guard 
against unwarranted attribution of human characteristics to other species’ (Keeton 1967: 
452), computer-animated film anthropomorphs are thus no longer burdened with the 
anthropocentric teleology of humanity, but are instead free to indulge gestures and rhythms 
that are rooted in their non-humanity. Indeed, the sporadic exclamations of ‘squirrel’ made 
mid-sentence by anthropomorphic canine Dug in Up (Pete Docter, 2009) not only 
verbalises the involuntary resurfacing of the character’s suppressed morphē (otherwise 
disguised in his technologically-assisted proclivity for human speech), but literally speaks to 
the ongoing recovery by computer-animated films of a more non-human oriented 
vocabulary. 
Given the emphasis placed by computer-animated films on the morphē as it able to 
suddenly cut across, interrupt, invert and guide the behaviour of anthropomorphs, a 
fruitful antidote to this new mode of digital anthropomorphism is the affiliated concept of 
therianthropy. One of many hybridised figurations of mythology that collate human and 
animal points of reference, the human/non-human ratio that structures therianthropy bears 
out precisely how computer-animated films have plotted new paths for traditions of 
animated anthropomorphism that are more readily anchored to a presiding non-humanity. 
Therianthropic images, according to Simon Baker, combine ‘the form of a beast with that 
of Man,’ but do so in a manner that relates to the metamorphosis from original human form 
into animality (2001: 108). Combining ánthrōpos with θηρίον (theríon) meaning beast or 
wild animal, therianthropes exist as human figures with animal features, traits or tendencies, 
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and are characters especially common to mythology and the fantasy genre. However, the 
manner in which Eisenstein describes the poetization of ‘man in an image—in the form of 
an animal,’ articulates a strong therianthropic rather than anthropomorphic mode of 
thinking in early animated storytelling (1988: 48). In this way, therianthropy (and affiliated 
concepts such as zoomorphism) emerges as a potentially useful animal/human rubric for 
identifying several representational norms of traditional, rather than digital, animation.2  
Prior to the advent of digital technology, animated characters were typically 
therianthropic avatars for the animators who created them: cel-animated constructs that 
privileged human connotation over an engagement with their non-human morphē. Walt 
Disney’s twenty-sixth animated feature The Great Mouse Detective (Ron Clements, Burny 
Mattinson, Dave Michener & John Musker, 1986) offers an obvious analogue to 
contemporary computer-animated anthropomorphism. The ‘mouse detective’ character in 
the Disney film’s title prefigures the rodent/chef dualism of Ratatouille’s Remy, and thus 
corroborates (rather than invalidates) the splintered identity that underpins the animated 
anthropomorph as a crossbreed figure. Closely following a therianthropic representational 
style, the grafting of human schemata, mannerisms and intellect upon Basil the eponymous 
mouse/detective forfeits several nuances of rodent behaviour. He communicates little 
about mousehood and the tribulations of being a rodent living in nineteenth-century 
London. Functioning as essentially a human clothed in beast (in this case rodent) form, 
Basil has more in common with the biological reality and lifestyles of Humankind. He 
smokes a pipe, plays the violin and his mouse-hole residence on Baker Street (our Baker 
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Street of human proportion) is decorated with antiques and a roaring log fire. There is 
minimal engagement with his rodent identity (his morphē) and the film, like many of its 
cel-animated predecessors opts instead to paint its worlds as strikingly therianthropic. 
Animation scholars may query this assumption that pre-digital animation (and 
particularly Disney) failed to fully confront the anthropomorph’s morphē component. 
What about the celebratory musical number ‘Everybody Wants to be a Cat’ from The 
Aristocats (Wolfgang Reitherman, 1970)? Or Lumière’s ‘Be Our Guest’ song-and-dance 
routine in Beauty and the Beast (Gary Trousdale & Kirk Wise, 1991) in which he claims to ‘do 
tricks’ with his ‘fellow candlesticks,’ or the hyperactive Genie in Aladdin (Ron Clements & 
John Musker, 1992), who constantly restates his mythological status as a supernatural force, 
explaining through song that Aladdin has ‘never had a friend like him.’ However, 
‘Everybody Wants to be a Cat’ is rendered a paradox by the cats that perform it. The 
felines have little trouble playing instruments, singing and dancing in a way that 
recognisably approximates to human form (just as King Louie’s desire in The Jungle Book 
[Wolfgang Reitherman, 1967] to ‘be like’ Mowgli, or Louis the alligator’s wish to be a 
‘human being’ in The Princess and the Frog [Ron Clements & John Musker, 2009] seems 
equally redundant given their proclivity at song, dance, and in the case of Louis playing the 
trumpet). Secondly, Lumière and his companions Cogsworth and Mrs. Potts in Beauty and 
the Beast are literal therianthropes, cursed to live as a candelabra, clock and teapot 
respectively. Yet all are switched back into their original human bodies to resume their prior 
roles as maître d’, majordomo and housekeeper. Beauty and the Beast thus anticipates 
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Disney’s later therianthropic characters Emperor Kuzco (The Emperor’s New Groove [Mark 
Dindal, 2000]) and Tiana and Naveen (The Princess and the Frog), whose switch from their 
magically-induced morphē of mammal (llama) and amphibian (frog) are similarly reversed 
once the characters have redeemed prior moral indiscretions. Finally, the supernatural 
Genie, whilst not strictly a therianthrope, is nonetheless morphed into a loose human 
appearance during the film’s emotive ‘happily ever after’ climax. His Pinocchio-like quest to 
be ‘set free’ is satisfied through his visual transformation into human shape, thereby 
reversing villainous Jafar’s own transition from human-to-genie (suitably, the sorcerer then 
returns to humanity in the sequel).3 These metamorphoses back to human form contrast 
with Princess Fiona in DreamWorks’ irreverent computer-animated film Shrek (Andrew 
Adamson & Vicky Jenson, 2001) who, in an emphatic rejection of ánthrōpos, openly shuns 
her human identity to remain what Lord Farquaad dismisses as a ‘disgusting’ ogre. The 
sequel Shrek 2 (Andrew Adamson, Kelly Asbury & Conrad Vernon 2004) does include 
sequences in which Shrek and Fiona each lapse into human semblance, but now it is their 
ánthrōpos selves that are framed as abnormal, and so both are restored to their ‘authentic’ 
ogre (morphē) identities in a shared pact of true love. A similar fate befalls therianthrope 
Dr Cockroach in the studio’s more recent Monsters vs. Aliens (Conrad Vernon & Rob 
Letterman, 2009), whose extradiegetic transformation into an insect from his original 
human is one that the film chooses never to rectify.  
The computer-animated film’s progressive investment in the morphē of its 
characters reaches a climax in Ratatouille, Pixar’s aforementioned culinary comedy telling the 
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story of rat-turned-chef Remy. Brad Bird’s film takes its place alongside Disney’s The Great 
Mouse Detective in a popular 2-D animated rodent tradition, which began with Mickey 
Mouse’s Plane Crazy (Walt Disney & Ub Iwerks, 1928), but which also contains The Rescuers 
(Wolfgang Reitherman, John Lounsbery & Art Stevens, 1977), The Devil and Daniel Mouse 
(Clive A. Smith, 1978), The Secret of NIMH (Don Bluth, 1982), Heidi’s Song (Robert Taylor, 
1982), An American Tail (Don Bluth, 1986), The Rescuers Down Under (Hendel Butoy & Mike 
Gabriel, 1990), An American Tail: Fievel Goes West (Phil Nibbelink & Simon Wells, 1991) and 
television series Tom and Jerry (Hanna-Barbera, 1940-), Danger Mouse (Brian Cosgrove & 
Mark Hall, 1981-1982; 2015), Tube Mice (Sara Bor & Simon Bor, 1988) and Biker Mice From 
Mars (Rick Ungar, 1993). What distinguishes Ratatouille from this rat pack is a consistent 
admission of protagonist Remy’s own rathood at the expense of anthropomorphic 
impersonations of human beings. The film begins with his voiceover narration, which 
laments the basic ‘problem’ that he is a rat. ‘This is me,’ he concedes, in a gesture that self-
consciously verbalises the inherent tensions and schizophrenia of a human/non-human 
character. Remy’s admission also directly reverses the crisis of identity experienced by 
villainous Ratigan in The Great Mouse Detective who claims that he is, in fact, ‘not a rat’ but a 
‘big mouse.’ Though Ratigan’s riposte is designed to address ‘humanity’ as the act of being 
humane and benevolent, his words also reflect how the film preserves a fundamental 
humanity (ánthrōpos) to its characters over that of their ‘rathood’ or morphē. Indeed, as an 
animated revision of Professor James Moriarty in this Sherlock Holmes retelling, the 
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strongly humanised Ratigan is dressed in a bespoke tailored grey suit, top hat, white gloves 
and an embossed gold cane, despite his sporadic lapses into a more feral physicality. 
Within the context of other computer-animated films, however, Remy’s narration 
in Ratatouille also serves another purpose. Evoking Woody’s angry retort to Buzz Lightyear 
in Toy Story that he is ‘just an action figure,’ Weaver’s ‘you da ant’ praise to fellow insect Z 
in Antz (Eric Darnell & Tim Johnson, 1998), Samson’s motivational dictum in The Wild 
(Steve Williams, 2006) that ‘you’re a lion, be a lion’ and Socrates the lion’s admission to 
chimpanzee Toto in Animals United (Reinhard Klooss & Holger Tappe, 2010) that ‘playing 
Monkey must be fun,’ Ratatouille’s narration instantly establishes the self-reflexive treatment 
of one of animation’s defining characteristics, that of using animals-as-characters. Later in 
the film, Remy accompanies his father Django to an exterminator shop, whose window is 
adorned with a macabre display of dead rats, poisons and rat-traps. Reviewer Andrew 
Osmond notes that this sequence reminds Remy how ‘rats and humans are natural foes’ 
(2007: 66), yet it simultaneously brings into relief their incompatibility as species through a 
visceral confrontation with the rats’ own mortality and existence as vermin. The graphic 
shop-window display therefore resolves a conundrum posed earlier in the film, in which 
Remy is heard briefly squeaking in his native rat tongue, rather than the American accent of 
stand-up comedian Patton Oswalt who otherwise provides his speaking voice. The abrupt 
switch from human vernacular to high-pitched squeaks makes audible the inherent tensions 
of identity embedded within the anthropomorph. This moment also suggests that any shift 
away from ánthrōpos to morphē is neither finite, nor is it irreversible, but a fluid ‘dialogue’ 
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between the two possibilities.4 Anticipating Dug’s highly comic ‘squirrel!’ proclamation in 
Up, the ‘slash’ dividing Remy’s character is therefore carefully constructed to allow the 
digital character frequent, but perceptible, slips into non-human identity. Ratatouille 
therefore encourages the audience to rethink the potential (im)balance of human 
representation and animality across animated anthropomorphism, offering a glimpse into 
how computer-animated films might begin to restructure its human/beast binary. 
 
Focalization and fictions 
By erecting a more permeable and fluid boundary between ánthrōpos and morphē, the 
anthropomorph of the computer-animated film has itself ‘morphed’ into more than simply 
a figuration of human resemblance. Rather than hold an anthropomorphic mirror up to 
human form and mimic its distinguishing characteristics or traits, these films have begun to 
unravel the tensions and connections between ánthrōpos and morphē, the animate and 
inanimate, subjects and objects. In the computer-animated feature-film, there is a greater 
investment in the volatility between the two poles, a deeper interest in objects as objects 
rather than objects as humans: rats-as-rats, rather than rats-as-chefs. This reversal in agency 
from human ánthrōpos to non-human morphē is, however, most commonly articulated in 
computer-animated films through dynamic point-of-view subjectivity, a degree of 
perspectival intrigue, and a continuous innovation of spectator viewpoint. The computer-
animated film’s engagement with the morphē has, this article suggests, produced 
multifarious axes of action. The varying of angles and the reorganisation of the spatial 
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coordinates within these fictional worlds is the product of an anthropomorphic eye (the eye 
of the anthropomorph) that is in constant positional flux. Transmitting the story in this 
manner creates a style of anthropomorphic narration couched in more vivid and visually 
dynamic terms, with a new saliency and forcefulness that has its roots in an 
anthropomorph who has rejected its human essence in favour of exploring the dynamic 
potentials of its morphē.  
In tune with this new animated treatment of anthropomorphosis, the 
anthropomorph itself has shifted into new territory and begun to assume alternate textual 
properties. Characters such as Remy have evolved into more prescriptive and functional 
agents: part of the computer-animated film’s textual system, which controls, expands, 
modifies, limits, and alters spectators’ access to that which unfolds in its fictional worlds. 
Through an engagement with their subjectivity, the spectator is optically guided by the 
anthropomorph through various diegetic matter, transforming it into meaning. The visual 
methods by which the spectator discovers and explores the fiction’s spatial constituents 
and dimensions are not detachable from the anthropomorphic perspectives from which 
they have been shown. As the hub of such diegetic information, the anthropomorph thus 
becomes, in Gérard Genette’s terms, a narrative ‘focalizer’ of the constructed fiction (1988: 
72). Focalization describes the angle of vision ‘from which the life or the action is looked 
at’ (qtd. in Stam, Burgoyne and Flitterman-Lewis, 2005: 82). It is a term that can become a 
verb (‘focalizing’ or ‘to focalize’) or adjective (‘focalizor’), in a way that point-of-view and 
perspective cannot (Bal, 1985: 143), and so it provides an expedient way of examining the 
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computer-animated anthropomorph’s dynamic interaction with its digital world (‘the 
focalized’). These films regularly (re)construct their fictional worlds by using the spatial 
proximity of the anthropomorph (as a dominant focalizor), and the array of unexpected 
angles of vision that can emanate from it. One additional point to consider when 
examining how plot action or events are filtered through anthropomorphic perception is 
Seymour Chatman’s work on ‘diegetic consciousness.’ This term pertains to the intellectual, 
emotional and perceptual parameters of a character in relation to its place in the fiction 
(Chatman, 1990: 146). All that we need to know of the computer-animated world is, in fact, 
often all that we can possibly know from the anthropomorph’s mediating perspective and 
primary consciousness (a primacy or immediacy to diegetic events). Personalising the space 
in this manner creates the world as aesthetically and stylistically anecdotal, a virtual reality 
that is visually channelled through the anthropomorph’s individual activities, movements 
and viewpoints within, through and across it. Anthropomorphism in the computer-
animated era can, therefore, be recast on the side of diegesis, and involved in a wider 
discourse of fictional world creation, transmission and representation. Computer-animated 
worlds are not solely ‘lived’ through an anthropomorphic humanity or recognisable 
‘actants,’ but through an engagement with the anthropomorph’s ‘diegetic consciousness’ 
that is heavily inflected by its other identity as a non-human.  
Let us return to Ratatouille alongside another computer-animated film, Bee Movie 
(Simon J. Smith & Steve Hickner, 2007). Both have their worlds continuously narrated 
through disorientating, dynamic perspectives and an innovation of viewpoint that owes a 
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debt to the computer-animated film’s increased engagement with morphē. Ten minutes 
into Ratatouille, Remy and his brother Emile are confronted with a shotgun-wielding 
Grandma trying to rid her house of a rodent infestation. The action traverses both 
horizontal and vertical planes, and it is the manoeuvrability of Remy and Emile as they 
scatter that takes the sequence through a variety of spatial levels: from floors, to tables, 
kitchen tops, along gas pipes and structural beams, to an explosive climax upon a swinging 
chandelier (which, in a comic epilogue, crashes to the floor to return the sequence back to a 
human level) (see Figures 2a and 2b). A similar exploration of space occurs in 
DreamWorks’ Bee Movie. The film tells the story of oppressed worker bee Barry B. Benson, 
whose non-conformist attitude leads him to reject the labour of the Honex Industry 
workforce, and instead assume a more active role away from the production line. During 
his first flight outside the safety of the hive with the Pollen Jock Flying Corps, insect Barry 
becomes attached to the fur of a tennis ball. This unfortunate act prompts a kinetic 
sequence in which the spectator follows the ball’s unstable trajectory as it is served and 
traverses the net back and forth between the players (see Figure 2c). The ball then 
inadvertently leaves the court, propelling Barry into a maze of New York traffic, from 
which he is then sucked into the labyrinthine engine of an oncoming motorcar, the camera 
following his negotiation of the vehicle’s pumps and pistons (see Figure 2d).  
[Figure 2 position] 
The viewing positions tendered during these sequences are unconcerned with 
satisfying a live-action promise, instead foregrounding the numerous capabilities and 
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potentials of anthropomorphic representation. The space is consistently reconstructed and 
reframed through a sustained volley of conceptual and innovative viewpoints, the source of 
which being Remy, Emile and Barry, whose anthropomorphic eye is privileged over that of 
the other human characters who partake in the scenes. The visual experience of each 
sequence thus emerges from the immediacy through which each event is diegetically 
narrated, and the function of the anthropomorph as a focalizor of the action in soliciting 
such narrational modes. But within each film’s broader allegiance towards the 
anthropomorph’s subjectivity, it is ultimately the morphē identity, or ‘morphē eye,’ which is 
rendered most dominant, and central to how the scene (and its narrative drama) is 
transmitted. The camera did not need to occupy such intrusive, exploratory and dynamic 
positions; the animators could certainly have located it elsewhere, telling the story from 
more conventional, ‘grounded’ places within the fictional world. But it is the energy of the 
non-human morphē eye and its aptitude for spatial discovery that is used to inscribe the 
spectator into the world, and skew their perception of the events that unfold there. Remy 
and Barry’s ‘take’ on the scene - their own specific focalized angle of vision as rat and bee 
protagonists - is animated to be the spectator’s own viewing position. The sequences as they 
are shown, and the viewpoints disclosed, engage with the anthropomorph at the new level of 
morphē. The spectator is not confused by the text’s subjective strategies, nor do the films 
yield to a disorder that edges the spectator closer towards absolute incoherence and 
abstraction. Rather, Bee Movie and Ratatouille absorb and invite the audience (through the 
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figure of the anthropomorph) to participate in a spectatorial game that sharpens their 
awareness of the virtual realm and its spatial dimensions.  
The action that takes place in computer-animated films is mediated and mobilised 
by the mobility of the anthropomorph, and by the film-maker’s increased investment in the 
diverse potentials of the morphē. Yet such is the aptitude of the virtual camera (a 
revolutionary technical development operational beyond wholly animated cinema) that it is 
licensed to ignore the anthropomorph and manoeuvre anywhere it chooses. This is something 
Mike Jones is keen to stress when describing the spatial composition and vanishing points 
of the virtual camera in Monsters, Inc., one that moves ‘in a way that defies time and space, 
ethereally beyond it’ (Jones, 2007: 236). Conceiving the unrestricted virtual camera as a 
‘phenomenon of intangible and abstracted presence,’ Jones actually turns to the 
humanizing effect of anthropomorphosis, suggesting there is an ‘anthropomorphic 
embodiment’ to the digitized space that creates the illusion that it has its own point-of-
view: an ‘eye’ because it is an ‘I’ (2007: 237). However, this attribution of an omnipotent 
perspective downplays the concrete textuality, tangibility and presence of the 
anthropomorph as a particular resident or inhabitant of the fiction. In fact, it is the virtuosity 
of a virtual camera no longer restricted by human positioning, or by its status as physical 
apparatus, which can permit the relocation of subjectivity into the anthropomorph’s ‘eye’ in 
the first instance, a figure that through anthropomorphism itself already exists in the text as 
an animate ‘I.’  
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Deleuze and gaseous perception 
This new tactile treatment of an anthropomorphic eye/I in computer-animated films 
subsequently ‘anthropomorphises’ the spectator as an embodied navigator of the virtual 
space. Such a process permits what Giuliana Bruno calls embodied tours of the ‘cine-city,’ a 
term especially resonant with the vigorous Ratatouille and Bee Movie sequences, in which the 
spectator shifts from a ‘static contemplator’ into a mobilised anthropomorphic state 
undertaking journeys in virtual space (Bruno, 2002: 56). With perception freed from the 
physics of human perspective and allied to the non-human (Remy, Barry), computer-
animated films can be illuminated by the systems of subjective variation and fragmentation 
formulated around what Gilles Deleuze has called ‘gaseous perception.’ This is an abstract, 
free-floating mode of expression that Laura U. Marks describes as akin to drug-induced 
delirium (2000: 161). Breaking with the normal conditions of human subjective experience 
allows the audience to achieve an open flow of ‘hallucinogenic’ perception that can be said 
to be experienced by objects, which are situated in their position of uncontaminated 
objectivity. As Deleuze puts it, this is ‘the pure vision of a non-human eye, of an eye which 
would be in things’ (Deleuze, 1986: 81). Not only do these observations accord with 
computer-animated films’ repeated reliance on non-human protagonists to tell its stories - 
from garden gnomes (Gnomeo and Juliet [Kelly Asbury, 2011]) to penguins (Penguins of 
Madagascar [Eric Darnell & Simon J. Smith]) - but the purity of a subjectivity ‘in things’ 
describes a spectatorial disengagement from human compositional logic. Gaseous 
perception therefore fits within the broader shift occurring in the anthropomorphic 
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representations of computer-animated films away from ánthrōpos (human subjectivity), and 
towards the possibilities of the morphē (the object or ‘thing’). Although unrelated to his 
brief comments on animation made in Cinema 1 and instead theorised in relation to mid-
twentieth century American experimental cinema (Stan Brakhage, Michael Snow, Jordan 
Belson, Ken Jacobs), Deleuze’s ‘gaseous’ conceptualisation of decentred point-of-view 
perception free from anchor points nonetheless seems to fit with the heterogeneous virtual 
spaces tended by - and through - the anthropomorph. There is certainly something 
compelling and ‘hallucinogenic’ about a computer-animated ‘cine-eye’ (itself an 
anthropomorphic means to describe cinema) that behaves like the randomized movement 
of a molecule or, for that matter, a rat or bee. Even the etymological roots of hallucination 
in Latin - meaning to wander mentally - are reflected in the capabilities of Remy and Barry for 
sporadic and erratic behaviour as they negotiate the geography of their own ‘cine-city.’  
By not separating its viewpoints from the purposeful focalised subjectivity of non-
human agents, computer-animated films naturally tender a different kind of ‘free-floating’ 
subjectivity not as fully amorphous as the ‘gaseous’ mode of perception engendered for 
Deleuze in 1960s experimental film (which resisted the creation of a centralised subject). 
This is despite the increased flexibility of digitally-assisted film production and computer-
animation that enables a more intuitive virtual camera, one whose own continuous ‘free-
flowing movement’ described by Jones (2007: 237) more readily aligns with the altered, 
hallucinogenic state and audiovisual sensorium central to Deleuze’s notion of a ‘gaseous’ 
cinema. However, even with perspective conducted through the anthropomorph as an 
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agent of irregular perception, computer-animated films are no less ‘at the service of 
variation and interaction’ (Deleuze, 1986: 80). The rhythmic pacing and action of the 
enlivened non-human (that is, crucially, exploited for its virtues as such) foreground the 
flux of randomness in movement; those spaces and dimensions that are visible but become 
momentarily occluded; and the reflexive play on digital technology’s capabilities for 
transgressive spatial orientation. Both Ratatouille and Bee Movie can ultimately be considered 
‘gaseous’ insofar as they involve multiple sequences whose spectacle derives from a 
boundlessly shifting composition and the connections between multiple diegetic points. 
William Brown argues that ‘for Deleuze, cinema becomes gaseous when it escapes human 
perception and abandons its otherwise all-pervasive anthropocentricism’ (2012: 268). The 
non-anthropocentric (perhaps, newly morphē-centric) cinema accessible in computer-
animated films (re)makes the virtual space and its perspectives not as solid, but as a highly 
gaseous set of spectatorial experiences. The mise-en-scène of Ratatouille and Bee Movie 
frequently emphasises the momentum of subjectivity as both de-centring force and chaotic 
impact, rooted in the very intensity (and uncertainty) of proximity yielded by the 
anthropomorph’s agitated, airy non-human body.  
The dislocation from physical constraints and spatial experimentation, following 
the disorientation stimulated by hallucinogens, is therefore not a delusion or mirage, for it 
has its roots in the concrete textuality and diegetic presence of the anthropomorph. This is 
the method, the ‘drug,’ which can induce in spectators such animated hallucinations and 
the gaseous state. Deleuze’s claim that the gaseous ‘cine-eye’ (Dziga Vertov’s non-human 
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eye) is ‘not the eye of a fly or of an eagle, the eye of another animal,’ obtains additional 
significance in computer-animated films because their ‘cine-eye’ is often precisely that 
(1986: 83-84). Their many ‘animalised’ embodiments even coexist with abstracted 
perspectives made available by the subjectivity of objects not conventionally 
anthropomorphised as humanlike subjects in scientific or social cognition (due to their lack 
of obvious physiognomic markers), such as a baseball and bat (Everyone’s Hero [Colin Brady, 
Daniel St. Pierre and Christopher Reeve, 2006]) or garden vegetables (Cloudy with a Chance of 
Meatballs 2 [Cody Cameron & Kris Pearn, 2013]). Shifting away from the stable point-of-
view of human subjects to the decentred and ‘gaseous’ anthropomorph takes us into 
another, perhaps more obvious, area of Deleuzian philosophy. Through an embodied ‘cine-
eye’ - whether a fly (A Bug’s Life [John Lasseter, 1998], eagle (Valiant [Gary Chapman, 
2005]) or a penguin (Happy Feet [George Miller, 2006]) - computer-animated films enact 
Deleuze and Felix Guattari’s concept of ‘becoming-animal’ which, despite being not strictly 
an anthropomorphic impression of humanity, remains concerned with the partition 
between human and animal (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987: 265). Here, ‘becoming’ is attained 
through an ‘unnatural participation’ predicated on penetration and spectatorial 
embodiment. Creative and fictional ‘becoming’ is intrinsically related to animated 
anthropomorphism as an artistic process. It recalls both Winsor McCay (how would a 
mosquito operate) as well as Lasseter, who declared at SIGGRAPH (1987: 43) that 
anthropomorphic characters are embodied according to a fictionalised and hypothetical 
thought process.  
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The point-of-view (POV) shot becomes an intriguing tactic of ‘becoming’ in this 
respect, especially as it involves the unnatural merging of human with anthropomorphic 
eyes. A subset of the eyeline match, the POV shot features in a wide range of computer-
animated films as a technical flourish and emphatic display of subjective alignment (if not 
allegiance). Towards the beginning of Toy Story, for example, the embodied agency of 
Woody signifies the broader narrative shift away from human (Andy) to non-human (toy) 
perspective. As Woody glides down the bannister towards the arms of his owner (see 
Figures 3a and 3b), the disorienting angle of vision cues an adjustment in the film’s address 
to the spectator, one that is allied to the degree of consciousness and newly-suggested 
animate life behind the cowboy doll’s painted eyes. In Toy Story 3 (Lee Unkrich, 2010), the 
point-of-view shot becomes a similar device of drama. During a sequence at Sunnyside 
Daycare, the behaviour of the riotous, rampant children towards the plastic playthings is 
registered through Buzz Lightyear’s point-of-view, as the space ranger confronts (with his 
comically fixed, moulded grin) the looming mouth of a toddler that presses down upon 
Buzz’s plastic visor (see Figures 3c and 3d). Structured around what Edward Branigan calls 
the ‘point/glance’ shot and the ‘point/object’ shot (1984: 1), the repetition of point-of-view 
in computer-animated films spotlights its status as a key component of their visual 
language, as well as confirming its role in labelling anthropomorphic characters as emphatic 
focalizors. But it is also a stylistic device deployed by computer-animated films to involve 
their audience in a rhetoric of Deleuzian ‘becoming,’ whether this is ‘becomings-rat 
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[Ratatouille], becomings-insect [Antz], [or] becomings-wolf [Hoodwinked! (Cory Edwards, 
Todd Edwards & Tony Leech, 2005)]’ (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987: 265). 
[Figure 3 position] 
It would be something of a misnomer to discount how computer-animated films, as 
examples of mainstream narrative cinema, are not structured by an overarching ‘classical’ 
model of narration, one that traditionally privileges an illusionist, transparent textual system 
rooted in diegetic coherency and legibility. Many computer-animated films adhere to the 
logic of classical storytelling (establishing shot, continuity editing, 180-degree rule, 
shot/reverse-shot) at the same time as they fully confront the dizzying possibilities of 
anthropomorphic subjectivity, thereby revealing a push-pull relationship in their formal 
style between the visual bravura of animated intervention and a more restrained 
1940s/1950s Hollywood classicism. Toy Story, as Neupert argues, adheres ‘comfortably 
within many conventions of classical Hollywood storytelling,’ just as A Bug’s Life ‘follows 
fairly classical shot composition with a very functional pacing and some intensified 
continuity editing’ (2016: 92, 134). Charles Tesson in Cahiers du Cinéma similarly argues that 
with Toy Story 2 (John Lasseter, 1999) ‘the classical style of the mise-en-scène guarantees the 
character’s humanity’ (qtd. in Neupert, 2016: 151). While computer-animated films make 
use of classical ‘human-centred’ perspectives (and human characters) in their configuration 
of diegetic space, this is nuanced by a more erratic, variegated articulation of the digital 
environment attributable to the activity of the anthropomorph. With human characters and 
their perspective featuring as merely a component of the image, the attraction of computer-
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animated film anthropomorphism, then, involves the spectators’ ability to momentarily 
reject their own ánthrōpos, cross species, and take an embodied (rat’s-eye or bee’s eye) tour 
of the virtual world in the skin of another kind. The heightened flexibility of the 
anthropomorph as a non-human morphē permits it to surmount the limitations of a 
human (ánthrōpos) eye that is an otherwise fallible and immobile receptive organ. Through 
the animator’s exploitation of non-human morphē over that of the figure’s human 
connotation or ánthrōpos, the anthropomorph of computer-animated films ultimately 
becomes the pinnacle of putting ‘perception into things,’ into ‘matter,’ the pure vision of a 
non-human eye (Deleuze, 1986: 83). During each of these ‘becomings,’ the spectator (as 
perceiver) relinquishes power over the fiction to the anthropomorph, and must accept its 
subjectivity and its morphē as the mediating interface.  
 
Conclusion: A plasmatic fiction? 
Networked across a variety of computer-animated films, the anthropomorph has given the 
filmmaker license to experiment with the spatial horizons of the digital world through 
conceptual perspectives and orientations, without impediment. The anthropomorph’s 
sporadic behaviour and dynamism of movement (anchored to the morphē of its existence) 
continuously makes available a range of proximities and observation points, deployed to 
involve the spectator in a rhetoric of seeing things differently through the inhabiting and 
embodiment of place and space. Computer-animated anthropomorphs provide a fluid 
interchange of observation points and axes of action, constantly reframing or ‘deforming’ 
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the action to allow the spectator to perceive the events taking place in the fictional worlds 
through a highly inventive cinematic eye. Within this intensification of anthropomorphic 
subjectivity and its raising to a higher pitch of emphasis, the anthropomorph itself enlivens 
all corners of the virtual world in which it resides. Just as the library of mobile doors in 
Monsters, Inc. descend, dip, spiral and rove through the fictional space during the film’s 
climax, the anthropomorph similarly crafts for the spectator innovative and inventive entry 
points into the virtual geography. The fictional world is transformed into an open (and 
opened), multi-dimensional state of omni-directionality in which no one angle is privileged, 
but whose spatial coordinates are made variant through the continual exchange of the 
horizontal and vertical axes of action. The arrangement of pixellated space and binary code 
in the computer-animated film frame becomes activated in its entirety by the kinaesthesia 
and virtual virtuosity of the anthropomorph, whose gaseous, molecular contact with the 
virtual cartography is able to ‘animate’ each pixel of this digital domain into agency.  
Such connections between character and fictional world returns computer-animated 
films to one of the defining virtues of anthropomorphic representation within animation, 
that of Eisenstein’s notion of ‘plasmaticness.’ There are certainly distant echoes of 
Eisenstein’s voice in Tobey Crockett’s use of ‘protean’ to describe his own fluid conception 
of a digital diegesis, particularly the discourses of power and powerlessness that he argues 
underscores ‘the emergence of a new subjectivity which comes with the territory’ (2009: 
118-119). Yet computer-animated films return to, and revaluate, ‘plasmaticness’ through 
the interactions between the anthropomorph and the fictional world that contains it. The 
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‘slash’ that splinters human and non-human identities can be reconceptualised as a new 
plasmatic channel, through which ánthrōpos and morphē frequently intersect and collide to 
form new power relations and anthropomorphic constructs. While animators may be heirs 
to anthropomorphic representations from hand-drawn techniques past, they have 
implemented digital technologies of the present to instil in the boundary a new protoplasmic 
instability that allows a more flexible engagement with the morphē. The ‘plasmatic’ energy 
of the ‘slash’ is subsequently transferred to the surrounding virtual world through the 
anthropomorph’s subjectivity, which reorients spectator viewpoint in a process that renders 
the dynamic digital space highly changeable. The ‘plasmatic’ experience of a film’s fictional 
world retains the same powers of seduction for the spectator as the animated line did for 
Eisenstein in the 1930s; its spontaneity, its freedoms and its omnipotence. The fictional 
milieus of the computer-animated film have ultimately begun to adopt many of the values 
associated with the anthropomorph, through their mutation into intensely subjectivied 
locales: a toy’s story, a bug’s life, a shark’s tale, or a bee’s movie. But the often 
discontinuous, disorienting exploration of ‘plasmatic’ place and space within a world, and 
the ability of the spectator to ‘dynamically assume any form’ (Eisenstein, 1988; 21) or, for 
that matter, any morphē, fail to compromise the validity of the fictional world as a world. 
The focalizing of computer-animated film fictions by the mediating force of the 
anthropomorph, and its capabilities for reorganising their world’s spatial coordinates, is 
part of a deliberately frenetic, aesthetic experience in which the spectator is constantly shown 
the geography of the virtual environment, rather than simply left to see it.  
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1 In the teaser trailer for Walt Disney’s recent computer-animated feature Zootropolis (Byron Howard, Rich 
Moore & Jared Bush, 2016), the word ‘anthropomorphism’ actually materialises onscreen to give shape and 
definition to the film’s modern civilized world and its humanised animal citizens. Dismissed by the voiceover 
narration as simply ‘a big fancy word’ that describes how animals ‘walk around on two feet, they do not go to 
work nude […] and they use technology,’ Zootropolis self-reflexively folds animation’s representational history 
back onto itself. 
 
2 Combining the Greek ζωον (zōon) with μορφη (morphē), zoomorphism occupies a similar representational 
terrain to that of therianthropy. Zoomorphic images across art, religion and mythology involve animal 
characteristics being grafted onto non-animals (humans, gods), thereby visualising human behaviour as 
equivalent to (or comparable with) animal actions. In both instances of human/animal intersection, the 
humanity of the construct is preserved, either as the normalised default into non-human other and back again 
through shape-shifting (therianthropy), or as the foundation onto which animal attributes are superimposed 
(zoomorphism). Disney’s ‘classic’ cel-animation, I would argue, operates more according to this 
therianthropic/zoomorphic predominance of humanity. As Donald Duck put it in the Disney cartoon Early 
to Bed (Jack King, 1941), ‘Maybe I’m just a duck, but I’m human!’, thus disclosing the degree to which the 
studio’s animated characters maintained human conduct at their centre. 
 
3 In The Return of Jafar (Tad Stones & Alan Zaslove, 1994) - and while still being a genie - the royal vizier 
maintains his human façade in order to be ‘a little less overwhelming.’ Furthermore, despite their prevailing 
discourse of therianthropy, Disney’s anomalous decision to jettison its practice of transforming non-humans 
back into humans for Brother Bear (Aaron Blaise & Robert Walker, 2003) produced, as Wells notes, a 
‘genuinely surprising ending’ given that protagonist Kenai wished to stay in his enforced bear form and not 
return to his true humanity (2009: 47).  
 
4 Alex the lion (Madagascar [Eric Darnell & Tom McGrath, 2005]), grizzly bear Boog (Open Season [Jill Culton, 
Roger Allers & Anthony Stacchi, 2006), chimpanzee Comet (Space Chimps [Kirk DeMicco, 2008]), Nat the 
preteen fly (Fly Me to the Moon [Ben Stassen, 2008]), Bolt the dog (Bolt) and Reggie the turkey (Free Birds 
[Jimmy Hayward, 2013]) are some of the other computer-animated film characters who have been heard in 
their true morphē or animal parlance, rather than the linguistic proficiency of their (often ‘star’) voice actors.  
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